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Abstract 
Control transmission represents a central problem in any type of organization. 
However, while prior research has extensively studied the factors influencing the choice 
of control modes as well as the effects and dynamics of control, the transmission of 
control from controller to controllee has been largely neglected in the project control 
literature. Our study addresses this gap by examining in-depth the transmission of 
control in a large IS project involving multiple control dyads. Our preliminary results 
suggest that outcome control transmits well through the entire project hierarchy (i.e., 
between senior managers and project managers as well as between project managers 
and project team members), while behavior control only transmits well between project 
managers and project team members.  
Keywords:  Control transmission, control theory, case study 
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Introduction 
Control theory is the primary theoretical lens through which the process of guiding individuals to project 
completion has been understood (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997). Prior research on control in 
information systems (IS) projects has extensively studied the factors influencing the choice of control 
modes (e.g., Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997; Kirsch 2004; Rustagi et al. 2008), as well as 
the effects of control on project performance (e.g., Gopal and Gosain 2010; Tiwana 2010; Tiwana and Keil 
2009). Despite these significant contributions, two gaps in the literature are particularly noteworthy: 
First, prior literature has focused almost exclusively on specific controller-controllee dyads, including the 
relationship between the IS manager and the project manager (Kirsch 1996; Kirsch 1997), the client 
liaison and the project manager (Kirsch et al. 2002), or the project manager and the project team 
(Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch et al. 2010). However, these studies regularly build on prior work 
without clarifying whether they focus on the same or a different control dyad than the studies to which 
they compare their results. Other studies do not specify on what control dyad they focus. By doing so, an 
implicit assumption is made that control actions and portfolios do not systematically differ between 
different control dyads. Second, the great majority of previous studies on IS project control rely on data 
reported by only one side of the control dyad, i.e., either the controller (e.g., Nidumolu and Subramani 
2003; Tiwana and Keil 2007) or the controllee (e.g., Kirsch 1996; Kirsch et al. 2002), thereby leading to 
the implicit assumption that control mechanisms used by the controller are perceived the same way by the 
controllee. 
The two research gaps highlighted above point to an important but largely neglected issue in the project 
control literature–the transmission of control from controller to controllee. The concept of control 
transmission can be divided into two sub-concepts. One aspect of control transmission refers to the 
consistency with which control mechanisms received by a controller are given to the controllee, and thus 
reflects how closely subordinates emulate their superiors in their own control attempts (Ouchi 1978). This 
aspect of control transmission is here referred to as intra-node control transmission. Another aspect of 
control transmission pertains to the accuracy with which control mechanisms given by the controller are 
received by the controllee, and thus describes whether controller and controllee have the same or 
different perceptions of the applied control mechanisms. This second aspect of control transmission is 
here referred to as inter-level control transmission. Thus, control transmission illustrates how control 
mechanisms “move” through the project hierarchy. 
Control transmission represents a central problem in any type of organization (Ouchi 1978), including 
temporary organizations such as IS projects. For example, it is likely that control mechanisms will only 
influence controllee behavior and thus contribute to achieving project goals when they are accurately 
received by the controllee. Similarly, intra-node control transmission is critical in projects involving 
multiple control dyads. In such projects, higher-level controllers are responsible for determining whether 
or not the objectives have been met and, if not, to take appropriate control over the level below them and 
so on to successively lower levels (Ouchi 1978). Therefore, higher-level controllers may require some 
consistency in the process of control at various levels in order to be able make effective decisions. 
Despite its criticality, the transmission of control has not been addressed in the project control literature. 
We aim at closing this gap by examining the transmission of control in a large IS project at a 
multinational engineering organization. 
The next sections provide an overview of the project control literature and introduce the concept of 
control transmission. Later sections outline our research methodology, preliminary findings, and 
conclusions. 
Control Theory 
Control Modes and Mechanisms 
IS project control primarily draws on agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989a). The principal-agency perspective 
of control suggests that there is a controller (principal) who uses a set of control mechanisms to ensure 
that the controllee (agent) performs its assigned tasks appropriately (Eisenhardt 1989a). These 
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mechanisms constitute a portfolio of controls (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997), and are 
typically categorized into formal and informal controls. Mechanisms used to exercise formal control are 
documented by management, whereas mechanisms of informal control represent unwritten determinants 
of behavior (Jaworski 1988). 
There are two modes of formal control—behavior and outcome control. Behavior control operates when 
management holds the individual responsible for following prescribed processes but does not hold the 
individual responsible for the outcome (Jaworski 1988; Kirsch 1996, 1997). Behavior control can be 
effectively used when work procedures leading to desired outcomes are known and observable 
(Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch 1996). Rewards and sanctions are based on the controllee’s adherence to the 
specified behaviors (Kirsch 1996). Examples of behavior control mechanisms include development 
methodologies, walkthroughs, work assignments, system documentation, progress reports, and direct 
observation of personnel (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). In contrast, outcome control 
focuses on the outputs (both interim and final) regardless of the process (Jaworski 1988; Kirsch 1997). To 
effectively implement outcome control, the controller needs to be in the position to define targeted project 
outcomes and compare them to actual outcomes (Kirsch 1997). Rewards and sanctions are based on the 
quality and timing of the delivered outputs. Examples of outcome control mechanisms include interim 
project milestones, budgets, standards, functional specifications, and expected levels of performance 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1996, 1997).  
The two informal control modes are self and clan control. Self-control is reliant on an individual’s ability 
to monitor and control her/his own actions (Henderson and Lee 1992). The controllee sets his own goals 
for the assigned task, self-monitors, and self-rewards (Kirsch 1997). Thus, control mechanisms supporting 
self-control are primarily implemented by the individual controllee (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003). 
However, the controller can also take actions to facilitate the use of self-control by the controllee, for 
example, by hiring self-controlled project personnel or recommending specific software testing 
procedures (Kirsch 1996; Kirsch et al. 2002). Here, a certain degree of trust in the intentions of the 
controllee is usually viewed as the primary prerequisite for effectively using self-control (Tiwana and Keil 
2009). Kirsch (1997) defines a clan “as a group of individuals who are dependent on one another and who 
share a set of common goals” (p. 217). Thus, clan control aims at minimizing the differences between the 
controller’s and controllee’s preferences (Eisenhardt 1985). It is implemented by control mechanisms that 
promote common values and beliefs (Kirsch 1997), or identify and enforce acceptable behaviors through 
shared experiences and rituals (e.g., regular joint meetings) (Kirsch 1996; Ouchi 1980). Rewards and 
sanctions are based on whether individual members act in accordance with group values, norms, and 
objectives (Kirsch et al. 2002). Controllers, who are often outside of this peer group, can both contribute 
to the building of a clan and the leveraging of an existing clan for the purpose of goal fulfillment (Chua et 
al. 2012).  
Control Transmission 
In order to fully understand the concept of control transmission, it is helpful to start with a definition of 
“control given” and “control received”. In line with Ouchi (1978), we define control given as the degree to 
which the controller exercises control as perceived by her- or himself, and control received as the degree 
of control as perceived by the controllee. Here, it is important to note that in large projects with multiple 
control dyads some individuals act as controller and controllee at the same time (Choudhury and 
Sabherwal 2003). For example, a senior manager may control the project manager who, in turn, may 
control the project team. In this example, it would be the responsibility of the project manager to 
“translate” the controls received from the senior manager into controls appropriate for controlling the 
project team (i.e., control given). Accordingly, intra-node control transmission refers to the relationship 
between control received and control given within one supervisory rank (Ouchi 1978). It thus shows how 
closely subordinates copy their superiors in their own control attempts. On the other hand, inter-level 
control transmission refers to the relationship between control given by a higher level (controller) and 
control received by a lower level (controllee). Here, it is important to note that both controller and 
controllee perceptions relate to the same set of control actions, namely those exercised by the controller. 
This enables us to determine whether controller and controllee have the same or different perceptions of 
the applied control mechanisms. 
So far, there has only been one study by Ouchi (1978) which has examined the transmission of control. In 
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this study, Ouchi focuses on retail department stores, and thus traditional, non-temporary organizations 
characterized by clear lines of authority and direct and immediate control (Powell 1990). His results 
indicate that outcome control transmits more readily through the organizational hierarchy than behavior 
control. However, we do not know whether his results translate to temporary organizations such as IS 
projects. Such projects are typically non-routine and involve individuals with diverse skills and expertise 
(e.g., Kirsch 1997; Rustagi et al. 2008), and thus exhibit characteristics distinct from “ordinary” 
organizations. Furthermore, Ouchi’s study has not examined the transmission of informal clan and self-
controls. 
We aim at extending Ouchi’s study by empirically examining the transmission of formal and informal 
control in a multitier project control system. We thereby address calls from prior literature to examine the 
interactions across multiple control dyads within large multi-stakeholder projects (Chua et al. 2012; 
Kirsch 1996). 
Hypotheses 
The control system of an internal IS project typically consists of three hierarchical levels: (1) Senior 
managers having formal authority over (2) project managers who, in turn, have direct authority over (3) 
project team members. In the following, we argue that inter-level control transmission patterns partly 
differ across the two interfaces between these hierarchical levels, i.e. across the interface between the 
senior and project management levels and the interface between the project management and project 
team levels. This distinction is in line with Mähring (2002) who differentiates between control over the 
project (exercised by senior managers) and control within the project (carried out by project managers). 
Figure 1 illustrates the typical hierarchy of an IS project, including key participants as well as their formal 
control relationships. In the following, we develop our hypothesis regarding the transmission of control 
through the hierarchy of an IS project.  
 
 
Figure 1. Project Hierarchy 
 
Behavior control is typically considered to be highly flexible. Thus, it is able to capture a large range of 
desired activities and satisfy local needs (Ouchi 1978). However, “we cannot expect [senior managers] to 
be aware of the subtleties of behavior which are valued” (Ouchi 1978, p. 175) on the project level because 
of the hierarchical distance. Furthermore, senior managers often do not have the task knowledge that is 
required to pre-specify work processes and procedures. For example, as Thompson (1961) argues: 
“Whereas the boss retains his full rights to make all decisions, he has less and less ability to do so because 
of the advance of science and technology” (p. 47, emphasis in original). In contrast, we can certainly 
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expect project managers to be aware of such subtleties. This is because project managers usually work 
closely together with the project team and also possess the knowledge required to tailor behavior control 
mechanisms to the needs of the project team (Kirsch et al. 2002). On the other hand, outcome control is 
considered less flexible and subtle than behavior control (Ouchi 1978). However, it is usually quantifiable 
and thus at least apparently comparable across levels (Ouchi 1978). The high quantifiability of targeted 
outcomes facilitates controllers’ ability to measure outcomes and communicate respective control 
mechanisms. Consequently, we predict: 
H1a: Only outcome control, but not behavior control, transmits accurately between the senior 
management and the project management levels. 
H1b: Both outcome control and behavior control transmit accurately between the project management 
and the project team levels. 
Prior studies find that controllers combine formal and informal mechanisms into a portfolio of controls 
(Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997). These studies also suggest that controllers prefer formal 
control over informal control until a sufficient amount or “comfort zone” of formal control is reached 
(Kirsch 1997). Thus, controllers will add informal control mechanisms when they feel that enough formal 
controls are in place. This emphasis of formal control within the control portfolio is also likely to affect the 
controllee’s reception of informal controls given by the controller. This means that, independent of the 
actual level of informal control used by the controller, controllees receiving high levels of formal control 
will tend to perceive rather low levels of informal control. On the other hand, controllees receiving 
relatively low amounts of formal control will tend to more accurately perceive informal controls given by 
the controller. Thus, we assume that the amount of formal control will moderate the accurate inter-level 
transmission of informal controls. We therefore suggest: 
H2: Informal control transmits well (a) between the senior management and the project management 
levels as well as (b) between the project management and the project team levels as the amount of 
formal control transmitted decreases. 
Taken together, the above hypothesized relationships suggest an emulation effect on the project manager 
level with regard to outcome control, but not with regard to behavior control. In other words, while we 
hypothesize that outcome control will transmit well through the entire project hierarchy, we also theorize 
that behavior control will only transmit well on the project level, i.e., between project manager and project 
team (see H1a and H1b).    
Research Methodology 
We chose to examine a single case to study in-depth the phenomenon of interest (Miles and Huberman 
1994), i.e., how control is transmitted in a large IS project involving multiple control dyads. This 
methodology is considered appropriate for how, why and what questions (Dubé and Paré 2003; Paré 
2004) and especially suitable given the paucity of research on the transmission of control in IS projects. 
We selected a large IS project which met several criteria important for this study (Yin 2003). First, the 
selected project comprises multiple control dyads, and more importantly, we have been granted access to 
controllers and controllees from all control dyads of the project hierarchy. This allows us to 
comprehensively examine the problem of control transmission. Second, the project involves highly 
complex and novel tasks. Thus, it is likely that both informal and formal controls are used, thereby 
enabling us to investigate the transmission of all four types of control. 
Site Description 
The case site is a large IS project at a major engineering firm. In 2008, the firm embarked on a strategic IS 
project to accelerate the product lifecycle, facilitate global collaboration, and improve product quality. 
Previously, each of the six business units involved in the project operated its own individual product 
lifecycle management system. The new system was to replace the aging product lifecycle management 
systems in the business units, as well as integrate their production processes. The new system is rolled out 
in an iterative manner. In total, there are seven system releases. The first four system releases were rolled 
out without major disruptions and were considered successes. The final implementation of the new 
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system is planned for 2015. Figure 2 shows the project timeline. 
Several key stakeholders are involved in the project. There are two IS managers who are responsible for 
controlling the project managers. Senior management is supported by staff from the project management 
office that facilitates meetings, creates project management documents, and performs other support 
functions. The project managers, in turn, are responsible for controlling their respective team members. 
In total, there are eleven project managers responsible for different project tasks, such as data migration, 
testing, and implementation. In total, more than 200 persons are involved in the project. 
 
 
Figure 2. Project Timeline 
 
Data Collection 
Consistent with case study best practices, we obtained data from multiple sources (Eisenhardt 1989b; 
Paré 2004; Yin 2003). We examined archival data, including project progress reports, project 
management plans, and presentation slides. These materials were especially useful for us to trace the 
sequence of actions and events that occurred between 2008 and 2011. We also conducted a two-hour 
interview with the senior managers to inform us about the history and context of the project as well as key 
events and issues. This allowed us to gain a deep understanding of the project. 
We entered the site for interviews in mid 2012. Before each interview, we reviewed prior interviews and 
the most recent project documentation, and discussed issues we needed to raise with interviewees. In 
addition, we created an interview protocol and adapted it to reflect changes in issues as the project 
progressed. We started the interview by asking interviewees about their role in the project, the tasks in 
which they were involved, and the deliverables for which they were responsible. We then asked 
interviewees about their perceptions of the controls used by their immediate superior (control received), 
as wells as their own control attempts (control given). In addition, we asked interviewees to describe 
problems and issues they encountered during the project, steps taken to resolve problems, their personal 
relationships with colleagues and how they interacted with them. We closed interviews by asking for 
interviewees’ perceptions of project performance.  
We conducted 15 semi-structured interviews: five interviews with distinct project managers, and ten 
interviews with team members from five distinct teams. At this point, it is important to note that the data 
collection is still ongoing. In total, we have scheduled 35 interviews (one interview with each of the two 
senior managers, one interview with each of the eleven project managers, and interviews with at least two 
team members of each team). 
The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1.5 hours. Interviews were conducted face-to-face on site. 
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One interviewer asked the majority of questions and focused on maintaining eye contact with the 
interviewee. The other interviewer primarily focused on taking notes. Assigning researchers different 
roles is a typical and recommended interview strategy (Dubé and Paré 2003; Eisenhardt 1989b). All 
interviews were tape-recorded. We conducted no more than three interviews per day to ensure that 
interview quality was not compromised by fatigue. We also took field notes to record observations of, for 
example, the physical office arrangement (Paré 2004). 
In addition to the interviews, we will conduct a quantitative online-survey to increase our ability to make 
valid and well-substantiated conclusions (Paré 2004). Invitations to participate in the survey will be sent 
by one senior manager to all project participants by the end of September 2012.   
Preliminary Results and Conclusions 
In this study, we are interested in answering the question of how control is transmitted in an IS project. 
Our preliminary results are reported in the following.  
First, while project managers seemed to receive some outcome control, they seemed to receive very little 
behavior control. While there was a project plan that included important milestones and specifications, it 
was rather treated as a rough guideline and was meant to be tailored by the project managers. On the 
other hand, project managers reported to be well aware of the delivery dates and the expected 
performance levels. Thus, while outcomes were clearly communicated, there were no step-by-step rules to 
be followed. In contrast, project managers largely guided themselves in their work, and took responsibility 
for work outcomes. Thus, our results provide initial support for Hypothesis 1a. 
“I sometimes met with [the senior managers] to inform them about the results. […] In general, I 
worked highly autonomous. In fact, they never really intervened.” (Project manager A) 
The project managers, in turn, relied on behavior control to a much greater extent, both with regard to 
variety and intensity of the applied mechanisms. All project managers set up regular meetings in order to 
stay informed about the work progress and assign tasks to the team members. Furthermore, they 
continuously monitored the work process. Monitoring team member behavior was also facilitated by the 
physical office design: there are no separate offices for team members and project managers; project 
managers and team members are seated next to each other in a big “open office”. Besides behavior 
control, project managers also used outcome control. For example, they used to break down the high-level 
milestones depicted in the project plan into manageable interim milestones and communicated them to 
the team members. 
“We have regular meetings where we discuss the current status and assign new topics. I also like 
to stop by and check things face-to-face. […] From my personal experience, it is important to 
accompany the work process. You need to know what’s going on.” (Project manager B)   
Finally, both behavior and outcome control seemed to transmit well between project managers and team 
members. These results are discussed in the following. First, behavior controls are considered flexible 
mechanisms that can capture a wide range of desired activities (Ouchi 1978). Such flexibility seems to 
facilitate accurate inter-level transmission. Furthermore, the project managers indicated to be highly 
experienced in their professional field. Thus, they possessed the knowledge necessary to tailor behavior 
controls to the specific needs of the project team members. This might explain why behavior controls were 
received accurately by the team members. Second, the high quantifiability of targeted outcomes seems to 
facilitate the project managers’ ability to communicate outcome control mechanisms, thereby leading to 
accurate outcome control transmission. Thus, our preliminary results indicate a high accuracy in the 
transmission of both behavior and outcome control between the project management and the project 
team levels, providing initial support for Hypothesis 1b.    
“[The project manager] pre-specifies the deliverables very clearly. He does not say ‘do as you like’ 
but rather ‘do it like this and that’, and in the end we go through the results together.” (Team 
member B)  
Taken together, our results suggest that outcome control transmits well through the entire project 
hierarchy, while behavior control only transmits well on the project level, i.e., between project managers 
and project team members.  
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In this study, we aim at enriching project control theory by exploring the understudied question of how 
control is transmitted in IS projects. In order to increase our ability to make well-substantiated 
conclusions we have already scheduled another 20 interviews. In addition, an online-survey targeted at all 
project participants will be conducted by the end of September 2012. We plan to finish our data collection 
by the beginning of 2013. 
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